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Abstract 
We studied public goods using an economic experiment. Subjects invested in the productivity of the 
public good as a group, and voluntarily contributed to provision as individuals. Investment was near the 
socially optimal level, but contributions were too low.   
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Executive Summary 
In recent years, environmental quality has attracted more and more attention from the public. Everyone 
enjoys the benefit of having a cleaner environment, but individual efforts are needed in order to 
maintain the environmental quality. In economics, such goods are called Public Goods. They are non-
rival—the consumption of one individual does not reduce the benefit of others, and non-excludable—no 
one can be excluded from consuming the good.  
In many cases, both institutional and individual efforts are required to provide a public good. 
Looking back at the example of environmental quality, institutions such as the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) are established to design policies. The policies alone will not improve our environmental 
quality unless everyone cooperates, and that is where individual contributions come in. Therefore, the 
effectiveness of policies depend on the level of individual cooperation, and also on the strength of the 
EPA—how many people are working for it, and how much money does it get each year from the federal 
government. Those two factors both depend on the general population. People working for the agency 
come from the general population, and funding for the EPA is from taxation, which is collected from 
everyone living in the country. Therefore, it can be argued that the productivity of the public good 
(environmental quality) depends on individual “investments”. 
In the past, economists have studied about the provision of public goods a lot. However, the 
focus has mostly been on voluntary contributions. There are very few studies that incorporate the effect 
of an institution, and most of them used institutions as a medium for sanctioning. No previous study has 
modeled individuals “investing” in the productivity of public goods as a group, which is what we study in 
this project. We study how well people make the tradeoff between investing in the productivity of the 
public good as a group, and contributing voluntarily as individuals, given fixed endowments. 
3 
 
We conducted economic experiments in the Social Science and Policies Studies Department’s 
Experimental Economics Laboratory. Subjects in our study were recruited from introductory economics 
classes at Worcester Polytechnic Institute. Participation in the study was voluntary. Subjects were 
divided into fixed groups of four and played a repeated gamefor ten periods. To capture both the 
investment and contribution aspects, we divided each period of the game into two stages—the 
investment stage and the contribution stage. 
Each period of the game started with the investment stage. Each subject received an 
endowment, and voted on how much they wanted to invest in the productivity of the public good. More 
investment would result in a more productive public good, but the marginal return from investment was 
decreasing as investment got higher. After all group members had voted, the group investment level 
was determined using the median vote. This mechanism allowed us to exclude outliers in voting. After 
the investment stage was the contribution stage, where subjects contributed to the provision of public 
good voluntarily. Subjects could only contribute from the money left after the investment stage, so 
higher investment, although resulting in a more productive public good, would leave less money for the 
subject to contribute. After the subjects had made their contribution decisions, their payoffs for the 
round were calculated and displayed.  
 The four most important variables that we examined were vote, investment, absolute 
contribution and percentage contribution. Both vote and investment started at a high level that was 
above optimal, but declined over time. Their values were very close to each other during the initial 
periods, but by the later rounds, a gap opened up between the values of those two variables. By the 
final period, average investment was very close to the optimal level of investment, but average vote was 
not. Therefore, we conclude that the median vote rule for determining the investment level worked well.  
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 Both average absolute contribution and percentage contribution decreased over time, but the 
decline in average absolute contribution is not statistically significant. There was a highly significant 
relationship between relative contributions and investment, so higher investment does promote 
contributions. Based on our results, we have proposed a few recommendations including: 
1. Let people choose the productivity of their public goods, and 
2. Use the median voter rule to determine investment level. 
 This study will be an important contribution to the public goods literature. It provides a method 
for studying investment in the productivity of public goods, and an understanding of the relationship 
and dynamics between group investment and individual contributions. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Economists define public goods as goods that are non-rival and non-excludable. Non-rival means that 
consumption by one individual does not reduce the benefit for others. Non-excludable means that no 
one can be excluded from consuming the good. Some real world examples of public goods are a clean 
environment and a safe neighborhood. Every one living in the same the same city enjoys the same 
environment—no one can be excluded, and the neighborhood is equally safe whether it consists of ten 
or twenty families. 
Both examples require institutional effort as well as individual contributions. A clean 
environment needs policies enforced by governmental agencies such as the Environmental Protection 
Agency, as well as individuals’ effort from everyday activities. Let us take an example: reducing air 
pollution from mobile sources. The EPA has a policy called the Clean Air Act (CAA) for this purpose. The 
CAA was a mix of controlling emissions at the point of manufacture (refiners and importers) and with 
vehicle use. For example, the EPA regulated lead as well as other fuel addictives used in gas. From the 
individual perspective, instead of driving private cars, people can take public transportation, car pool, or 
simply walk to their destinations if the distance is not too far. All these actions reduce the use of private 
cars, and therefore reduce air pollution. 
Another example is that a good police department is essential for a safe neighborhood, but the 
crime rate will be low only if the residents cooperate with the police. This means that people should 
obey the law and report suspicious activities that they have seen. In order to establish the institutions, 
the government needs to make investments. The decisions about whether to invest are made by the 
President, Senators and Representatives from the House, who are elected by the general population. 
Money for investment is from tax revenue, which is collected from all individuals enjoying the benefit of 
the public good. The individual contributions, however, are not mandated from everyone. For example, 
someone who always drives his own car might be able to enjoy the benefit of clean environment 
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because everyone else is taking public transportation. This kind of behavior is referred to as “free-riding”, 
and is very prevalent in public goods games.  
The provision of public goods is a major topic that has been studied by many economists and 
psychologists. However, all previous studies investigate only the individual contribution aspect, not the 
group investment part of establishing institutions. Group investment is an essential part of the scenario, 
because the investment amount will directly affect the amount of benefit that the public good can 
generate. The productivity of the public good is often captured by the parameter marginal per capita 
return (MPCR) in public goods experiments.  
 In a standard public goods experiment, each subject is given an endowment, and is offered the 
choice of contributing to a group account versus a private account. Subjects earn a fixed return from the 
private account, but their earnings from the public account dependents on the contributions from other 
group members—they will be the product of the MPCR and the total group contribution. All group 
members receive earnings from the public account regardless of their contributions. The MPCR is a 
number between zero and one, so subjects will benefit from the public account only if multiple group 
members contribute to it. 
Although the effect of the MPCR on contributions has been a popular theme in previous studies, 
in most cases the value of MPCR was exogenously determined by the experimenter. To our knowledge, 
Isaac and Norton (2010) is the only study that has examined the effects of an endogenously determined 
MPCR. In this study, subjects were divided into groups of five, consisting of one “manager” and four 
“customers”. The “manager” was able to choose the MPCR to be either a high MPCR or a low MPCR 
(exact values were set by the experimenters) during every decision period. A detailed description of this 
experiment will be provided in Chapter 2, but one important thing to note is that the manager’s choice 
of MPCR is one of only three discrete values (high, low, and zero— closing institution) and is not directly 
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related to group investment. This design is not capturing the real world scenario very well, and we will 
be improving on it in our experimental design. 
In our study, the experiment was designed to capture both the group investment and individual 
contribution aspects of public good provision. In addition to the contribution stage (parallels the 
individual contribution scenario) for traditional public goods experiments, we added an investment stage 
in every period. During the investment stage, subjects invested in the productivity of the public good for 
the following contribution stage. A mandatory investment was made based on members’ votes. The 
design allowed us to study people’s behavior in a more realistic environment. The voting feature mimics 
the real world voting for political representatives, and the mandatory investment captures the fact that 
everyone is required to pay tax, which will then turn into governmental investments.  
Our analysis investigates the voluntary contribution of money in the presence of an investment 
stage. The trends of average investments and contributions are studied, as well as the relationship 
between MPCR and contribution rate in each game period. In previous studies, contributions have been 
found to be higher when MPCR was high (Isaac, Walker and Thomas, 1984; Marwell and Ames, 1981). In 
our study, we found that the percentage of contribution out of remainder (money left after investment) 
was higher with a high MPCR, but in terms of absolute contributions, there was no significant 
relationship between the variables. Usually, both investment and contributions were high at the 
beginning of experiment, but fell over the periods.  We also looked at the data from each individual 
group to find observations that are interesting and worth discussing.  
Our study allows a better understanding of human behavior in public good scenarios that 
require institutional investment. It will also contribute to the public goods literature, especially that on 
endogenously determined MPCRs. 
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Chapter 2: A Background on Public Goods Experiments 
Public goods experiments have long been an important topic for experimental and behavioral 
economists. This chapter gives a background on various versions of public goods experiments.  
2.1 The Basic Game 
2.1.1 Design of the Experiment 
In a standard public goods experiment, subjects are voluntarily recruited from undergraduate students 
in a university. Subjects are assigned to groups—usually of size four or five—and are told that they will 
participate in a decision making game. They are given endowments of money and asked to divide their 
endowments between a private account and a public account in any way that they wish. The private 
account has a fixed return for each token contributed (usually one cent), while the return from the 
public account depends upon the contributions of all members in the group.  
In order to calculate the return from the public account, we multiply the total contribution from 
the group by the marginal per capita return (MPCR). MPCR is a constant. It has the following properties: 
if a subject is the only person contributing to the public account, his/her return will be strictly less than 
that from contributing to the private account for any value of M < 1. If, however, all members of the 
group fully contribute to the public account, everyone will get a higher payoff than from everyone 
contributing to the private account. 
The payoff of each member in each period can be calculated according to the following equation: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 =  𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 −  𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖 + 𝑀𝑀 � 𝑐𝑐𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗 = 1  
where 
 𝜋𝜋 = payoff for the period; 
 𝜔𝜔 = endowment for the period; 
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M = MPCR; 
n = number of subjects in each group; 
c = contribution to the group account. 
2.1.2 Predictions and Hypotheses 
If the ability to make rational decisions and maximize personal payoffs is common knowledge among all 
members, the Nash equilibrium of the game is zero contributions to the public account. However, the 
highest payoff for a single subject is achieved when he/she contributes all of his/her endowment to the 
private account, and all other group members contribute fully to the public account. This situation 
creates an incentive for group members to free-ride—that is, not contribute to the public account, 
despite the fact that he/she will still get paid from the public account if anyone else has contributed. The 
optimal outcome in terms of efficiency, however, is full contributions to the public account. The group 
will earn the highest collective payoff if all members contribute fully to the public account, but each 
member will earn the highest individual payoff by free-riding. This makes the result of the game 
unpredictable. 
 Let us consider an example. Suppose we have a group of 4 subjects. Each subject receives an 
endowment of 10. Each subject contributes 5 to the group account, and M is 0.3. In this case, each 
subject will receive a payoff of 10 – 5 + 0.3 (5 + 5 + 5 + 5) = 11. If the subjects kept all their endowments 
and contributed nothing to the group account, each one of them would receive a payoff of 10. 
 A real world example of the public goods game could be the problem of environmental 
protection. A better environment will benefit everyone, but protecting the environment is costly. It is 
more profitable for everyone to do activities without caring about pollution. For example, hybrid cars 
cost more than regular cars that burn gas only; using the public transportation takes longer, and is less 
convenient than driving your own car. We have to make decisions like these every day. 
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The basic public goods experiments mainly focus on testing the empirical validity of the ‘free-
riding hypothesis’, which has two versions—the strong version (stating that on a voluntary basis, nothing 
will be contributed to be public good), and the weak version (stating that voluntary contributions to the 
public good will be suboptimal). Several important studies of this are Marwell and Ames (1979; 1980; 
1981) and Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984).  
2.1.3 Results and Findings 
There are several common findings from the studies above. The weak version of the free-riding 
hypothesis received more support than the strong version across all studies (the average contribution in 
most studies is around 40%). In repeated games, a general decrease of contributions to the public 
account over time has been observed (Isaac, Walker and Thomas, 1984). This ‘decay’ of contribution 
over time has been observed in many other studies as well. Contributions usually start around 50-60% in 
period one, and fall to around 20% in the last period. Some studies even observed zero contributions in 
the last period (Andreoni, 1988; 1995; Andreoni, Harbaugh, and Vesterlund, 2003; Isaac and Walker, 
1988). 
From the decay pattern, it seems that people are learning the dominant strategy (which is zero 
contributions to the group account) through the learning process, but the pattern might also be due to 
the strategic play of subjects (Andreoni, 1988). Further research on this matter will be discussed in 
Section 3. The experiments reported nontrivial contributions to the group account even in the final 
periods. This indicates that people are not acting completely selfishly. 
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2.2 Changing the Basic Game 
2.2.1 A Higher MPCR Results in Higher Contributions 
Marwell and Ames (1979; 1980) conducted two studies exploring the effects of different parameters in 
public goods games, including group size, MPCR, endowments, provision points, stakes, and experience. 
They had several hypotheses: 
1. Members with higher MPCRs contribute more to the public account; 
2. Small groups invest more because actions in small groups are more perceptible; 
3. Provision points (points at which the return from the public account increases dramatically) 
increase contributions; 
4. Higher stakes result in more free riders; 
5. Experienced subjects are more likely to free ride. 
The studies were conducted so that contact between experimenters and subjects happened 
through mail and phone calls. High school students between the ages of 15 and 17 were used as 
subjects. They were randomly assigned to groups, and the decision making process was single-shot. The 
treatment of unequal MPCR was constructed so that one member of the group received 45% of the 
group’s earnings, while other members each received 18.33%. To conduct an experiment without a 
provision point, the growth of MPCR was kept constant. Higher stakes were created by increasing the 
return from private accounts. Experienced subjects were students who had participated in the previous 
study; and among those experienced subjects, there were high contributors as well as low contributors. 
One thing to note is that people who are told they were in large groups were deceived—they were, in 
fact, also in groups of four— just like the small group members.  
The divergence from the standard experiment was most significant in small groups with unequal 
MPCRs: the member with the high MPCR contributed all or nearly all of his/her endowment 75% of the 
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time. In large groups with unequal MPCRs and unequal endowments, however, the people with higher 
MPCRs and higher endowments only contributed about the same amount as others. Neither the change 
of the provision point, stakes or experience had an effect on the outcome of the experiment. 
Experienced subjects behaved similarly to the way that they did in the previous experiment—high 
contributors again contributed more, and low contributors contributed less. This implies that people’s 
behaviors are often consistent, probably due to preferences and moral beliefs. 
In both studies, many subjects reported caring about the ‘fairness’ of group contributions. That 
is, they believed that there is a “fair amount” when contributing to the public good. Many thought that 
half or more of their tokens was a fair amount to contribute. This, according to the authors, might have 
been caused by early training, which tells people that group welfare is just as important as personal 
welfare. Therefore, free riders are not prevalent in this study. 
2.2.2 Effects of High Stakes, Non-Divisible Payoffs, and Different Subject Pools 
Marwell and Ames (1981) also changed the parameters of the basic public goods game. Three changes 
were found to have significantly different results from the standard experiment (around 50% 
contribution of endowments).  
The first example is when high stakes are used—returns from both individual and group 
accounts were raised to five times as much as before. This resulted in a significant decrease in group 
contributions. One group had 35% contributions while the other group had 28% contributions. Note that 
although these are significantly lower contributions than in the standard experiment, they are still much 
higher than the Nash Equilibrium of zero contributions.  
The second case is when a non-divisible good was used as a payoff to the group. Some college 
freshmen living on the same dorm floor were chosen as subjects for the experiment, and they were 
informed that their earnings from the group account could only be used to purchase something for their 
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floor. This resulted in a significant increase in contributions to about 80%. This is contrary to what the 
experimenters expected. 
 The third case is when graduate economics students were used as subjects. Those subjects, on 
average, contributed only 20% of their endowments, which is 40% of the average contribution. The low 
contribution results of this group might be caused by the way that those students have been trained—
they may tend to think more self-interestedly than normal people, therefore choosing the single period 
dominant strategy. 
2.2.3 Effects of Group Size and MPCR 
Isaac and Walker (1988) constructed a study to analyze the effect of group size and marginal return on 
group contribution, both separately and jointly. The hypothesis was that a higher MPCR and smaller 
group size would result in more contributions to the group account. 
The experiments used a standard subject pool, but all subjects were experienced—they had all 
participated in similar economic experiments before. The games were repeated, and each set of 
experiments consisted of two series of ten period decision trials—one trial with a low MPCR and the 
other with a high MPCR. Each group had either four or ten subjects (small and big groups). With this 
design, the experimenters were trying to examine  
1. The effect of changing MPCR under constant group size, 
2.  The effect of changing group size under constant MPCR, and  
3. The combination effect of changing both MPCR and group size. 
 Groups with lower MPCR had significantly more free riding. On the other hand, a higher MPCR 
led to higher group contributions. The effect of group size, however, is uncertain. If the size is increased 
with constant MPCR, more group contributions occur, because the total resource available to the group 
is increased. But if the MPCR is lowered together with an increase in group size, lower group 
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contributions and more free riding is observed. We can tell from these results that MPCR, as well as 
total resource in the group, is very important in determining group contributions.  
 Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984) also studied the effect of group size and MPCR on outcomes. 
However, their results were a little bit different from that the ones described above—more free-riding 
was observed when group size was increased with a constant MPCR. This study found MPCR to play a 
very important role. When the MPCR is higher, there is a greater incentive for members of the group to 
contribute, resulting more contribution and higher efficiency. 
2.3 Analysis of Cooperation and Free-riding 
Why do some people free-ride, while others cooperate? Two works of James Andreoni have focused on 
this question. Both studies were repeated games and used standard subject pools. 
2.3.1 Causes of Free-riding 
Andreoni (1988) investigated the cause of decay (decreasing contributions), or the convergence to free-
riding behavior over time—in repeated public good games. Two hypotheses are: 
1. The learning hypothesis—subjects learn the dominant strategy (contributing zero) over time, 
and 
2. The strategies hypothesis—subjects invest more in the beginning as a way to conceal the 
fact that they are self-interested. 
To test the hypotheses, Stranger groups and Partner groups were formed. 20 subjects were 
assigned to Stranger groups and 15 subjects were assigned to Partner groups. Both settings allowed 
subjects to play a ten period repeated game followed by three additional periods (these additional 
periods were not known by the subjects beforehand). Subjects in Stranger groups were randomly 
assigned to groups of five after each period, but subjects in Partner groups were in the same groups 
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throughout the experiment. Since the groups for Partners were fixed throughout the game, they might 
have contributed to the group account even knowing that contributing zero is the dominate strategy, 
because this can give other members an impression of them being cooperative. If other members 
contribute to the group account consistently, subjects can earn higher payoffs by free-riding in the final 
periods. Therefore, the experimenters expected more cooperation in Partner groups than in Stranger 
groups, but the results were exactly the opposite. Partner groups contributed consistently less, and 
showed more free riding than in Stranger groups. These results clearly reject the strategies hypothesis—
if people were playing strategically, they would have contributed more in Partner groups, but very small 
amounts, if any, in Stranger groups.  
 In periods 11-13 (the additional periods), Partner group subjects contributed similar amounts as 
in periods 1-3. This indicates that the decay is not a learning process either—if so, contributions in 
periods 11-13 would have been the lowest among all periods.  
The author suggested that nontrivial contributions to the group account might be caused by 
pleasures that people receive from cooperation. These pleasures may not be related to monetary 
payoffs. The decay might also indicate a group’s struggle to establish norms of higher contribution—
higher contributions to the group account are punished by lower total payoffs, so everyone contributes 
less as the periods proceed. 
2.3.2 Causes of Cooperation 
In Andreoni (1995), the cause of cooperation in public goods games was studied. Two hypotheses are 
stated. One hypothesis attributes cooperation to kindness, while the other attributes it to confusion.  
During the experiment, all communication between subjects and experimenters was through 
paper. Subjects were instructed to sit at numbered desks in a room. Instructions and decision forms 
were put into the packet that each subject received. For each period, the experimenter collected the 
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decision forms, calculated each subject’s payoff using a computer and provided an earnings report for 
each subject. The decision process was repeated for ten periods.  
The experiment was designed to separate the two causes of cooperation—kindness and 
confusion. Three types of treatments were designed to identify the cause for cooperation: Regular, 
RegRank, and Rank. Regular groups were just like regular public goods experiments. The Ranks groups 
were the same as Regular groups, except that subjects in these groups were paid according to their rank 
of earnings—the highest ranking in each group received the highest payoff. Individuals received 
information on their Ranking with each period’s earnings report. If there were ties, the subjects who 
tied split the pay-offs. Since the Rank treatment not only reduced the incentive for kindness, but also 
increased the possibility of confusion in the game (being more complicated than the Regular treatment), 
another treatment, RegRank, was added. In the RegRank treatment, subjects had information about 
their ranks in the group—like in the Rank treatment, but were paid according to their experimental 
earnings—like in the Regular treatment.  
 The results suggest that cooperation is caused half by kindness and half by confusion. In addition, 
Regular groups were observed to have the most cooperation and least free-riding, while Rank groups 
had the least cooperation and most free-riding. Confusion was observed to fall steadily over the periods 
(from one to ten), but there is no systematic pattern for the change in kindness.  
 We can tell from these results that kindness and confusion play equally important roles for 
causing cooperation. Kindness incentives might be very hard to remove from people, since they are 
related to personalities, social norms, etc. We are, however, able to reduce the effect of confusion. It is 
important to reduce confusion as much as possible when conducting an experiment, so that we can 
have more accurate data and have more confidence in our experimental results.  
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4. Communication 
Sally (1995) found communication to have a greater impact on cooperation than any other 
parameter in public goods games. However, the strength of the effect varies in different settings and 
among different forms of communication.  
2.4.1 Face to Face Communication 
 Isaac and Walker (1988) examine the effect of face-to-face communication. The hypothesis is 
that communication reduces free riding and increase contributions in a multi-period voluntary 
contribution environment.  
The experiment used a standard subject pool, but all subjects were experienced—they had all 
participated in some ‘trainer experiments’ before the formal ones took place. However, groups were 
distinct between the ‘trainer experiments’ and formal experiments. Three different designs were used 
to examine the effect of communication in different settings. The initial design compared three different 
decision environments where the only difference was the communication. Subjects all had equal 
distributions of resources and complete information about the experiment. Let us denote periods with 
communication with C and periods without communication with NC. The three different treatments in 
the experiments can then be represented as NC/NC, NC/C, C/NC. The observed result is that 
communication reduces free riding significantly, even when following NC periods of substantial free 
riding. However, if communication is allowed only in the first period, second period contributions do not 
grow higher. In the four C/NC experiments, three used communication successfully without occurrences 
of free-riding.  In the one group where defection did occur, group contributions dropped quickly from 
100% to 47% of optimal following the observed defection.  
The second design of the experiment introduced asymmetric distributions of endowments and 
incomplete information about endowments. Four groups, each with different treatments, were used to 
test the effect of information completeness and distribution of resources thoroughly. All four groups, 
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however, were C/NC groups. Contributions were significantly higher in the first period for all four groups 
(during which communication was allowed). Cross group comparisons show that contributions by 
symmetric endowment groups tend to dominate those of asymmetric groups, and contributions by 
complete information groups tend to dominate those with incomplete information. Groups with 
asymmetric endowments had a harder time agreeing upon 100% contributions to the group account.  
 The third design was a more complex one with larger groups (eight people). Decay was very 
obvious in this set of experiments. Communication did not work as well in these bigger groups (resulting 
in lower contributions), because agreements were usually less explicit, and people tend to rationalize 
noncooperation in bigger groups. It is also harder for subjects to understand the nature of this more 
complex game.  
Overall, communication reduces free riding and increases group contributions significantly. 
Communication has served as a tool for subjects to learn the implication of group profit, as well as 
building credibility among members. When the communication mechanism is taken out of the 
experiment, credibility ceases quickly if any defection occurs. This explains the decay pattern in most no-
communication trials. Successful communication is usually a combination of explicit agreement and 
learning of the optimal strategy.  
2.4.2 Different Mediums of Communication 
Bochet, Page and Putterman (2006) compared three different forms of communication—face-to-face, 
online chat room, and numerical cheap talk—and their effectiveness in promoting cooperation. The 
effect of punishment on top of these treatments was also studied, and those results will be discussed in 
Section 5. 
The experiment had eight types of treatments: baseline (B), face-to-face communication (FF), 
online verbal chat room (CR), numerical cheap talk (NCT), and each of the above with punishment (R, 
FFwR, CRwR, NCTwR; R stands for reduction, a more neutral way to say punishment).  Baseline 
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treatments are just like the standard public goods game. The MPCR was set to 0.4 for all sessions. The 
experiment used a standard subject pool, and subjects played repeated public goods games in groups of 
four. Except for the FF sessions, all interactions between subjects occurred over the computer network, 
and anonymity was preserved throughout the experiment.  
In FF sessions, subjects in each group were allowed to talk for five minutes after the 
introduction of the experiment. Threats and offers of side payments were not allowed in these talks, but 
everything else could be discussed freely. Subjects, therefore, were aware of who their group members 
were. However, it was impossible for them to identify each member during the experiment, since 
subjects were coded with letters that changed each period.  
In CR sessions, subjects could communicate through an online chat room before periods 1, 4, 
and 7. Restricted messages (regarding threats, side-payments, and revealing of personal identity) were 
blocked. The length of chat was not specified in the paper. Signaling emotional state is more difficult in 
the CR treatment, and that was what the researchers believed would make a difference in the level of 
cooperation. 
In NCT sessions, a “communication stage” was added at the beginning of each period. In this 
stage, subjects were able to instantly overtype their intended contribution amount in response to others’ 
messages for a fixed amount of time (length is not specified in the paper). In NCTwR treatments, 
subjects could also type in possible punishments together with contributions. Frequent responses and 
revisions of messages were observed. 
Face-to-face communication was found to cause a dramatic increase in contributions—full 
contribution in periods 1-4, 6, and 7, over 90% in periods 5, 8, and 9, and nearly 80% in period 10. 25/32 
subjects contributed fully even in period 10. These results are inconsistent with predictions based on 
payoff maximizing behavior. 
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The effect of chat room communication in increasing cooperation is less than face-to-face 
communication, but it still caused a significant increase compared to the baseline treatment. Most 
messages in CR treatments were mainly about figuring out the best strategy to maximize payoffs, while 
others were stating commitments to the group strategy. 
NCT did not increase efficiency over all. Some groups did succeed in establishing high 
cooperation and payoffs using the tool provided. Payoffs from these groups were much higher than 
baseline treatments. However, there were also other groups where members created free-riding 
opportunities for themselves using misleading messages. Payoffs from those groups were much lower 
than baseline treatments. Offsetting each other, the overall payoffs from NCT treatments were mostly 
the same as the baseline treatment. 
Open-end communication seemed to have greater effects on the level of cooperation, since 
verbal communication allows explicit commitments to a common agreement. NCT lacks a tool for 
members to proclaim commitments.  
5. Punishments and Rewards 
2.5.1 Punishment Only—By Punishment Points 
Fehr and Gächter (2000) tried to identify the impact of ‘punishment’ in public good games. There were 
two main aims in this paper: one was to show that cooperators are willing to punish free-riders even if it 
is costly for them to do so; the other was to test whether punishment will reduce free-riding behavior. In 
this experiment, cooperators were defined as those subjects contributing to the public good, and free 
riders were defined as subjects who do not contribute. 
 The hypothesis has not been clearly stated, but if we assume, as the author did, that subjects 
are rational, selfish, and able to use backward induction, no contribution and no punishment should 
take place at all. 
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 The experiment used a standard subject pool. It was designed for five sessions, testing the effect 
of punishment in both Stranger and Partner groups. Subjects in Stranger groups were reassigned to new 
groups in each decision period, while subjects in Partner groups remained in the same groups 
throughout the experiment. Each session of the experiment contained two sequences of decision 
making consisting of ten periods each. Of those two sequences, one was with punishment, and the 
other was without. To enable subjects to punish each other, the concept of “punishment points” was 
introduced. Each subject was able to assign at most ten punishment points to other subjects, each 
costing them a certain amount of resource (the cost for each point was different, and was given in a 
table provided to subjects during the experiment). For subjects receiving punishment points, each point 
would reduce their payoffs by 10%.  
 The result showed that punishments raised contributions significantly. Without punishments, 
the average contribution was close to full free-riding (zero contribution), while with punishments, the 
average contribution was above 50% of subjects’ endowments. In Partner groups without punishments, 
full free-riding emerged to be the dominant strategy; with punishments, however, full contributions 
emerged to be the dominant strategy because subjects who contributed below the group average were 
punished heavily. Also worth mentioning is that Partner groups with punishments were able to establish 
a common standard of group contribution; therefore, punishments were less prevalent in the later 
periods of these treatment groups—after all members of the group had conformed their contributions 
close to the group standard.   
 We can tell from this paper that punishment increases group contributions and reduce free-
riding behavior significantly. There were cases in this experiment where the same group contributed 
nearly all of their endowments in the punishment condition, but fully free-rided in the no-punishment 
condition. Also, most people had a tendency to punish free-riders (or low contributors as compared to 
the group average) even at a cost. This is irrational, but generally, it leads to higher payoffs by the end of 
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ten decision periods. The need for punishment ceases when contributions rise to the group standard. 
Without the cost of imposing punishments, the payoffs for each subject rise even higher. 
2.5.2 Punishment Only—By Expulsion from Group 
Cinyabuguma, Page and Putterman (2005) studied the behavior of people in a varied public goods game, 
where the expulsion of group members is possible at a cost. 
The hypothesis is that, since expulsions are costly, rational profit maximizing subjects will not 
use them. Knowing this, and using backward induction, rational players will contribute zero to the public 
account. 
The experiment used a standard subject pool. Subjects were assigned to groups of 16, and each 
group played two sets of 15-period repeated games. Subjects did not learn about the second set of 
games until the first set was finished. Two kinds of treatments were used: the baseline treatment (same 
as the standard game), and the expulsion treatment (expulsion of group members was possible). The 
voting procedures for expulsion will be discussed in detail in Section 6. 
All members start as members of the Green group. Expelled members were moved to the Blue 
group, where members received endowments of only five dollars each period, compared to ten dollars 
for Green group members. There were no voting stages in the Blue groups; all other aspects were the 
same for both groups. There was the BE game—a baseline treatment followed by an expulsion 
treatment, and the EE game—one expulsion treatment followed by another one.  
There were several findings from this experiment. Contributions were significantly higher in 
expulsion treatments even when we include the Blue groups. Green groups usually ended up having 
very high contributions by the end of each game. Blue groups, however, usually had zero contributions 
because there were never enough subjects in these groups to make the public good profitable. Also, 
contributions rose, rather than fell (as they did in the baseline treatments) over time—except for in the 
last period, where the contribution fell sharply. They also observed that expulsion votes served as a 
27 
 
warning to group members: if votes were cast to expel some members without succeeding, those 
members increased their contributions as a response.  
The expulsion mechanism can be one way to foster cooperation within groups. However, there 
is a “dark side” associated with this method: subjects might rely too much on expulsion— if this 
mechanism is taken away, contributions fall sharply—as it did in the final periods.  
2.5.3 Punishment Only—By Formal Sanction from Institution 
Putterman, Tyran and Kamei (2011) studied behavior related to formal sanctions in public goods games.  
Formal sanctions are defined as the “application of sanctions by a central authority or by a group acting 
collectively”. In this experiment, formal sanctions were imposed by the institution constructed 
voluntarily by subjects within each group. 
 In the experiment, standard subjects were pooled and formed into groups of five. Games were 
repeated for 24 periods. A fixed endowment of 20 was given to each subject in each period, and groups 
were fixed throughout the experiment. There were two kinds of treatments in this study: the Baseline 
treatment (standard public goods game), and the Penalty treatment. In the Penalty treatment, two 
important parameters were determined: a and b. a was the maximum level of penalty, and b was the 
‘exemption level’—members were free from punishment if they contributed to the group account at 
level b or higher. 
 In order to construct the formal sanction scheme, a voting period was added every 4 periods. 
Each four periods is referred to as a phase. During the voting period, members of each group voted on:  
1. Whether to punish contributions to the ‘private accounts’ or to the ‘public account’ (majority of 
vote); 
2. The maximum penalty level a (median value voted); 
3. The exemption level b (median value voted). 
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In Penalty treatments, subjects voted almost uniformly upon punishing contributions to private 
accounts. Compared to the baseline treatments, penalty schemes were able to increase contributions 
almost immediately. Also, contributions rose over time. Factors like IQ, political orientation, and gender 
had effects on the use of punishments—participants who were male, more cooperatively oriented, had 
a higher IQ, and lower political conservatism tended to use more punishments.  
The effect of formal sanctions was significant. The schemes were able to increase contributions 
immediately, and help group members overcome declines in contributions. Contributions rose over time 
when sanctions were present. 
2.5.4 Punishment Only—In Communication Settings 
Bochet, Page and Putterman (2006) studied the effect of punishment in different communication 
settings, as I have mentioned before. 
First of all, findings in R treatments (no communication) were similar to those from previous 
research—higher initial contributions, no decline until end periods, and an absence of overall monetary 
gains (higher contributions, but payoffs drop due to the cost of punishment). They also found that some 
uses of punishment were not strategic, such as punishments in period 10, the last period. These actions 
only decreased subjects’ payoffs, resulting in no future benefits.  
As found in Fehr and Gächter (2000), punishment can increase the level of cooperation, but is 
costly to individuals. By introducing communication to the experiment, the experimenters expected to 
reduce the demand for punishment, which would reduce overall cost, and increase efficiency. This was 
found to be exactly the case. 
Comparing treatments B and R, they observed an increase in cooperation, mainly due to the 
elimination of contributions declining over time. The paper argued that punishments induce higher 
contributions by creating fear of group members. However, in groups where verbal communication was 
available, subjects may have suffered from a guilty conscience if they did not commit to their group 
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agreements. This ‘self-punishment’ seems to be more effective than material punishments. This is 
probably why punishments did not do much in FF and CR treatments, since high cooperation in these 
groups were mainly achieved through friendly agreements, not threats.  
2.5.5 Punishments and Rewards—Proposer and Responder Game 
Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003) examined punishments and rewards separately and jointly in 
a series of two-person games. Groups of two people were used to avoid “free-riding on punishments by 
others”. Many people expected punishments and rewards to work as substitutes, but, as seen from 
results of this study, this is not exactly the case. 
The experiment used a standard subject pool. Each session had ten periods of decision making. 
Subjects were reassigned to new groups in each period, so no two subjects met more than once. Four 
different treatments were used in the design of experiment—Dictator (no reward or punishment), 
Carrot-Stick (both rewards and punishments available), Carrot (rewards only), and Stick (punishments 
only). In each treatment with rewards or punishments, the responder was able to, at a cost of one cent, 
change the proposer’s payoff by five cents. The only restriction on the amount of change was that the 
proposer’s payoff could not be reduced to a negative number.  
 The highest offers from proposers were found in the Carrot-Stick treatments, followed by the 
Carrot treatments; offers in Dictator treatments were the lowest. There was no trend of decline in the 
amounts offered, so the one-shot nature of this game was clearly understood by the subjects. 
Responders in Carrot treatments spent the most changing proposers’ payoffs, followed by Carrot-Stick; 
responders in Stick treatments spend the least. 
 The results suggest that rewards alone are not effective for promoting cooperation. Punishment 
alone increases the level of cooperation to a modest level. The combination of punishments and 
rewards have very strong effects—offers from proposers reach as high as 240 (full endowment) in 
Carrot-Stick treatments, compared to a mode of 40 (the smallest amount possible as specified in the 
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design of experiment) in Dictator treatments. The demand for punishment seems to be unaffected by 
the availability of reward, but the demand for rewards is greater in the absence of punishment. 
Therefore, the relationship between punishments and rewards is not merely substitutes. Punishments 
are rewards work together to promote cooperation—punishments can move offers away from the 
perfectly selfish point, while rewards can encourage further cooperation.  
6. Voting and Institutions 
Voting and the formation of institutions is a very important part of our study. This section discusses 
some previous work that either focused on, or incorporated voting mechanisms or institution formation. 
2.6.1 Voting for Expulsion 
Cinyabuguma, Page and Putterman (2005) included voting mechanisms in the design of their 
experiment. In order to expel members, a second stage following the contribution stage was introduced 
in each, except for the last, period. The following procedures were used for expulsion of group members: 
all subjects of a group start as members of the Green group, if half or more votes are cast to expel a 
member (or some members), they will be no longer in the Green group for the rest of the game. Instead, 
they will be moved to the Blue group.  
 In this study, expulsions, despite being costly, were used in most sessions, and a majority of 
subjects voted to expel group members at least once during the game. As we can tell from this result, 
the voting expulsion mechanism was useful for most people. 
2.6.2 Voting for Institution Formation 
Kosfeld, Okada and Riedl (2009) studied the endogenous formation of sanction institutions within 
groups. Three important hypotheses are stated in this paper: 
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1. There exists an organizational equilibrium (forming an institution) if the number of organization 
members is greater than or equal to the minimum number that will make the institution 
profitable; there exists a status quo equilibrium (not forming an institution) for any number of 
group members; 
2. If subjects all have a preference to maximize material payoffs, the number of institution 
participants (s) would be the same as the minimum size of the institution (s*) necesssary to 
make profit; 
3. The grand organization—institution that consists all members of the group—might be the strict 
organizational equilibrium under certain conditions. 
In the experiment, standard subjects were used. Subjects were assigned into groups of four, 
which were fixed for 20 periods of decision making. Three stages occur during each period of the 
experiment: 
1. Participation stage: group members vote for whether they would like to participate in an 
institution, members who would like to participate will be referred to as participants; 
2. Implementation stage: subjects are informed the number participants, and each participant 
chooses whether they would like to implement the institution or not. The institution will only be 
implemented if all participants agree to do so; 
3. Contribution stage: if an institution was implemented, the participants would be forced to 
contribute their full endowments  automatically, non-participants could contribute freely to the 
group account; if no institution was implemented, all group members contribute freely to the 
group account; 
There were two control treatments and two experimental treatments. In the control treatments, 
subjects played the standard public goods game without an opportunity to form institutions: PG40 
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(MPCR = 0.4) and PG65 (MPCR = 0.65); in the experimental treatments, the formation of institutions was 
possible: IF40 (MPCR = 0.4, s* = 3), and IF65 (MPCR = 0.65, s* = 2). The cost of implementing an 
organization was 2, and was split among participants. 
 There was almost always at least one member who would initiate an institution, but 
implementation was successful only about half of the time. A large majority of the institutions 
implemented were grand organizations. There were very rare cases where s < s*. The number of 
institutions formed increased significantly over time, and those increases were driven exclusively by 
implementation of grand organizations. There is evidence that subjects were aiming at grand 
organizations—the implementation rate was high only when all members of the group participate (over 
90%, compared to 23%-38% when s = s*). The implementation rate was also higher when a higher MPCR 
was used. Compared to the control treatments, efficiency was higher and more stable in the 
experimental treatments.  
 Overall, institution formation was an effective way to promote cooperation and increase 
efficiency. However, success of implementation is not guaranteed—a large number of institutions fail 
even when s > s*.  
2.6.3 Voting on Formal Sanction Schemes 
Voting mechanisms were also used in Putterman, Tyran and Kamei (2011). As described in the previous 
section, subjects voted on parameters for the sanctioning scheme. In most sessions, subjects voted for 
the option that would increase cooperation and efficiency (punish contributions to the private account), 
but there were also cases where subjects voted for the opposite. Since the overall result of the 
sanctioning treatment was better than the baseline treatment, we can conclude that voting on formal 
sanctioning schemes is useful for promoting cooperation and efficiency. However, it is also important to 
note that it may not succeed all the time. 
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2.6.4 Institution Formation—‘Manager’ and ‘Customers’ 
Norton and Isaac (2010) studied the formation of institutions that consisted of ‘customers’ and 
‘managers’. The experiments modeled REMs—retained earning maximizing non-profit organizations. 
These organizations operate just like normal profit-maximizing firms, but all their earnings are donated 
to charitable organizations and activities. 
 In the experiment, subjects were assigned to groups of five. Each group consisted of four 
customers and one manager. Both the customers and managers received 50 token endowments for 
each period.  From the customers’ perspective, the game was very similar to the standard public goods 
game. Each customer makes a choice between contributing to a private and public account for 24 
periods. The private account returned one dollar for each token contributed, and the return from the 
public account depended on MPCR and total group contributions. The determination of MPCR for the 
public account, however, was different from the standard game. The MPCR was chosen by the manager, 
between 0.3 and 0.75. Choosing MPCR = 0.3 cost nothing to the manager, but choosing MPCR = 0.75 
would cost the manager 30 tokens each time. The manager could also choose an ‘outside option’, which 
would allow him to ‘close the institution’ and receive a wage of 25 tokens. The manager could not 
contribute his/her endowment to the group account, but he/she also benefited from any contributions 
the customers made. The customers, on the other hand, did not know about the level of MPCR upon 
making a decision to contribute.  
 From the customers’ point of view, if all subjects are selfish and profit maximizing, the Nash 
Equilibrium is zero contributions. From the Manager’s point of view, the best choice is to:  
1. Close the institution and take the outside option if contributions are low; 
2. Choose MPCR = 0.75 if contributions are high. 
Choosing MPCR = 0.3 is never a profitable decision.  
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 Two types of transparency were important in these institutions: historical records and outside 
options. In this experiment, historical records refer to the manger’s choice of MPCR in past periods. In 
treatments where historical records were available, customers were told the manager’s choices of 
MPCR every three periods for the previous three periods. This is akin to quarterly reports in the real 
world. Outside options also served as a type of transparency because by choosing it, the manager 
reminded the customers of his/her credentials, signaling the customers to increase their level of 
contributions. 
 Three treatments were used in the experiment—Baseline (both historical information and 
outside option is available), No Info (only outside option is available), and No O/O (only historical 
information is available). In the Baseline treatments, managers usually chose MPCR = 0.75, and the 
outside option was seldomly used. Contributions were more stable compared to standard public goods 
games—there was no significant decay of contributions over time. In No Info treatments, the decay of 
contributions was more significant. Average returns from the Baseline treatments were higher than 
from the No Info treatments in almost all periods. Managers also chose the 0.75 MPCR less frequently. 
Results from No O/O treatments were similar to that from No Info.  
 We can tell that similar effects result when either transparency condition is removed. So adding 
transparency to the manager’s actions will, very likely, increase efficiency. In the real world, however, 
managers do not always have precise control over the group production technology (modeled by MPCR 
in the experiment). So revealing both the manager’s choice and the actual outcome might be useful. 
7. Summary 
Let us recap the key points of this chapter: 
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1. In a basic public goods game, subjects usually make nontrivial contributions to the group 
account, but optimal, full contributions are rarely observed. There is usually a downward trend 
of contributions over time. 
2.  High MPCR, high stakes, and non-divisible payoffs usually result in higher contributions. 
Graduate economics students were found to contribute less than standard subjects. 
3. Free-riding was neither a result of learning nor strategic play. Cooperation could be attributed 
half to kindness and half to confusion. 
4. Verbal communication, including face-to-face communication and online chatting, promoted 
cooperation and increased efficiency significantly. Numerical cheap talk did not increase overall 
efficiency. 
5. Different forms of punishment were all able to increase contribution, but the higher overall 
efficiency was not always observed because imposing punishments was costly. When both 
punishments and rewards were available, very high efficiency levels were achieved. 
6. Voting and institution formation mechanisms were often useful, and usually led to higher 
contributions as well as higher efficiency levels. 
In the next chapter we will present the design of our experiment. We will also present some analysis 
of the game and propose some hypothesis. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
This section explains the design of our experiment, as well as provides a basic analysis of the game. 
Based on the analysis, we propose three hypotheses. 
3.1 The Lab Setting 
All sessions took place in the Department of Social Science and Policy Studies’ Experimental Economics 
Lab located in Room 223A of Salisbury Labs. During the experiment, subjects were seated at private 
computer workstations, and all interaction occurred over the computer network. The experiment was 
programmed and conducted with the experiment software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). All procedures 
for the experiment were programmed into the software beforehand so that there would be minimal 
interaction between the experimenters and the subjects. During the experiment, subjects simply 
followed the instructions on their computer screens and entered their decisions using keyboards and 
mice. The experimenters were available for help if subjects had any questions during the experiment.  
3.2 Subject Recruitment 
All subjects were recruited from undergraduate students enrolled in introductory economics classes. 
Students were informed about the experiments during their lectures. If interested, students could join 
the mailing list to receive information about upcoming experiments. Once an experiment was scheduled, 
an email was sent out to the mailing list with the experiment’s time and place. Simple instructions for 
registration were also included in the email.  
Registrations were supported by the Regi 25 web application, which is maintained by the 
Computing and Communications Center of Worcester Polytechnic Institute. Regi 25 offer registrations 
for events from various departments around campus. To register, students would click on a link included 
in the email. After logging in using their WPI user name and password, the Regi 25 page would come up 
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and students could register for the session offered. To learn more about Regi 25, please refer to its 
website: http://www.wpi.edu/webapps/regi/. 
 Each session was run with eight subjects. However, during registration, one or two extra 
students were usually invited in case of no-shows. If all students showed up, the ones unable to 
participate were given a 5 dollar show-up fee, as well as the extra credit points in their economics 
classes as promised. Students unable to participate were welcome register to future sessions. 
3.3 The Experiment 
Before the experiment, each student was provided with two copies of the informed consent agreement 
form. Important information (such as possible risks and benefits) about the study was included in the 
form. All information related to the experiment was submitted to and approved by the Institutional 
Review Board of Worcester Polytechnic Institute. Participation in the study was voluntary. If the student 
agreed to participate in the study, he/she would sign and date the forms. One copy of the form was 
returned to the investigator, and the other one was given to the subjects for their records. After the 
consent forms were collected, instructions for the experiment were passed out and explained to the 
subjects.  
 The experiment was a repeated voluntary contribution game. Subjects were randomly assigned 
to groups of four. The groups remained fixed throughout the experiment for ten periods (the last period 
was known to all subjects).  Each period followed exactly the same procedure, consisting of two stages—
the investment stage and the contribution stage. At the beginning of each period, each subject was 
provided with an endowment of 10 Lab Dollars (LD). The conversion rate between Lab Dollars and real 
money is  1 LD = 0.1 USD. 
 Starting out with the investment stage, subjects would vote on their group investment in the 
marginal per capita return (MPCR).  All members of a group invested the same amount of money. When 
all four members of the group had voted, the highest and lowest votes were dropped, and the average 
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of the two middle votes became the investment level for the entire group. Let us denote MPCR by M 
and investment by I, the MPCR is then calculated as: 
𝑀𝑀 = √0.1 ∗ 𝐼𝐼 
Below is a graph of M verses I. As we can tell from this diagram, as investment increases, M increases, 
but the marginal increase in M is smaller as I grows higher. Thus, the investment has diminishing 
marginal productivity.  
 
Figure 1. Diminishing Marginal Return of Investment 
Also note that there are two special points on this graph:  
𝐼𝐼 = 0 → 𝑀𝑀 = 0 
𝐼𝐼 = 10 → 𝑀𝑀 = 1 
This means that, when the group invested nothing, their MPCR would be zero. In this case, anything 
contributed to the group account would simply disappear, because the group account was unable to 
generate any benefit—productivity of the public good is zero. On the other hand, if the group invested 
their full endowments, M would be the highest possible value—one. However, the members would have 
nothing left to contribute in the contribution stage. 
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After the value of M was determined, members of each group were informed about that value 
as well as the group investment level.  
 The contribution stage follows the investment stage, and proceeds just like a standard public 
goods game. Each member of a group began the contribution stage with (10 - I) LD. Subjects would 
decide on how much he/she would contribute to the group account. Payoff of the period for each 
subject was  
𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠 =  𝜔𝜔𝑠𝑠 −  𝐼𝐼 − 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 + 𝑀𝑀 � 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡4
𝑡𝑡 = 1  
where 
 𝜋𝜋 = payoff for the period; 
𝜔𝜔 = endowment for the period; 
I  = Investment ; 
M = Productivity of the public good; 
c = contribution to the group account. 
After 10 periods of decision-making, the payoffs for each subject were added up and converted 
to USD and a $5 show-up fee was added. Subjects were asked to complete a short questionnaire for 
some basic demographic information. Receipt forms were signed and payments were made in a private 
manner.  
3.4 Analysis of the Game 
3.4.1 Nash Equilibrium (NE) 
To find the NE for this game, we use backward induction and start by looking at the contribution stage 
of period 10. Assume all subjects are rational and self-interested, knowing this is the final period of the 
game, they should play the dominate strategy in a single-shot game—contribute nothing to the group 
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account. Given this, they should also invest nothing during the investment stage of period 10. If no 
investments and no contributions are made in period 10, same thing should happen in period 9, 8, 7, etc. 
If all subjects are to follow this logic, no investment or contribution will be made in any period of this 
game. Therefore, the NE for this game is zero-investment and zero-contribution in all periods. 
3.4.2 Pay-off Maximizing Outcome 
Find the symmetric maximum value of  
𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠 =  𝜔𝜔𝑠𝑠 −  𝐼𝐼 − 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 + 𝑀𝑀 � 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡4
𝑡𝑡 = 1   
As long as M > ¼, we should have 
𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 = 𝜔𝜔𝑠𝑠 −  𝐼𝐼 
� 𝑐𝑐𝑡𝑡
4
𝑡𝑡 = 1 = 4𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 
We can then simplify  
𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠 =  𝜔𝜔𝑠𝑠 −  𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 − 𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 + 4𝑀𝑀𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠 
𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠 =  𝜔𝜔𝑠𝑠 −  𝐼𝐼 − (𝜔𝜔𝑠𝑠 − 𝐼𝐼) + 4√0.1 ∗ 𝐼𝐼 ∗ (𝜔𝜔𝑠𝑠 −  𝐼𝐼) 
Simplify, get 
𝜋𝜋𝑠𝑠 = 4√0.1 ∗ 𝐼𝐼 ∗ (𝜔𝜔𝑠𝑠 −  𝐼𝐼) 
If we plug in 𝜔𝜔𝑠𝑠 = 10 and solve for 𝜋𝜋𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 , we will get 
𝜋𝜋𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ≈ 15.396 at 𝐼𝐼 = 103 ≈ 3.333 
Therefore, to maximize payoff, subjects should invest 3.33 LD during the investment stage, and 
contribute all endowments left (6.67 LD) to the group account in the contribution stage. 
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3.5 Hypotheses 
In this section, we propose several hypotheses about the outcome of our experiment. The investment 
stage and contribution stage are analyzed separately. 
3.5.1 Investment Stage 
Since the investment level is the same for all members of a group, subjects are investing in the 
institution collectively during the investment stage. Thus, from the perspective of an individual, there is 
no way to “free-ride” in this part of the game. In situations similar to this (members of a group has to 
make a collective decision), subjects have been found to vote for the option that would promote both 
cooperation and efficiency most of the time (Putter, Tyran and Kamei, 2011). However, without doing 
any calculation, it is hard to find the optimal level of investment, but it is very likely that subjects will 
learn the optimal level through repeated games over periods. We thus propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Group investment will start somewhere between 0 and 10 LD, and approach the optimal 
level (3.33 LD) over the 10 periods. 
3.5.2 Contribution Stage 
In this stage, subjects are contributing voluntarily as individuals. According to our self-interested 
assumption, everyone will try to earn the highest payoff by contributing nothing, while hoping everyone 
else will contribute fully, so that he/she can free-ride on the contribution of others. If everyone is 
following the same logic, then contribution will be zero.  
 However, this is not what has been observed in previous studies (Isaac, Walker and Thomas, 
1984). As we have stated before, the contribution stage is exactly the same as a standard public goods 
game. It is, therefore, appropriate for us to expect similar observations. Because weak free-riding was 
observed most of the time, we construct our second hypothesis as: 
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H2: Contributions will be above zero, but below optimal (full contribution) in the contribution 
stages. 
Another important finding from previous studies was the relationship between MPCR and 
contribution—higher MPCR values often lead to higher contributions (Isaac, Walker and Thomas, 1984; 
Marwell and Ames, 1981). We incorporate these findings into our third hypothesis: 
H3: The percentage of contribution out of remainder (amount of endowment left after 
investment) will be higher when M is high and lower when M is low. 
Since the MPCR in previous studies were not determined by endogenous investment, the maximum 
amount each subject could contribute was their full endowment. In our experiment, however, subjects 
could not contribute up to their full endowment because some of their money would be consumed as 
investment. The maximum limit for their contributions, then, is the remainder. That is why we use the 
percentage (of contribution out of remainder) as a measure of cooperation level. 
In the next chapter, we report the findings from our experiment. Behavior is mostly consistent 
with our hypotheses. Several interesting facts at the individual level will also be reported. 
  
43 
 
Chapter 4: Results 
4.1 Overview 
Eleven sessions were conducted. Eight subjects (divided into two groups) participated in each session. 
Therefore, we have a total of 880 observations at the individual level, and 220 observations at the group 
level. Overall, the average investment level was 4.068 (std. dev. 1.414) and the average contribution was 
2.939 (std. dev. 1.849). Average percentage contribution—the ratio of contribution over remainder, 
while remainder is endowment minus investment—was 0.517 (std. dev. 0.313), and the average payoff 
was 10.308 (std. dev. 2.218). Average earnings were $15.308 (std. dev. 1.490). A summary of the key 
variables is shown in Table 1. 
Variable Obs. Max Min Mean Std 
Dev. 
Vote 880 10 0 4.239 2.425 
Investment 220 9 0.75 4.068 1.414 
M 220 0.949 0.274 0.627 0.117 
Contribution 880 9.05 0 2.939 1.849 
Percentage 
Contribution 
880 1 0 0.517 0.313 
Payoff 880 16.854 2.372 10.308 2.218 
Total Earnings 88 19.841 11.490 15.308 1.490 
Table 1. Summary of Key variables 
4.2 Trends 
In this section, we graph the trends of vote, investment, M, contribution, and percentage contribution. 
4.2.1 Vote, Investment and M (Marginal Per Capita Return) 
Figure 2 presents the average vote and average investment by period. Both variables have a downward 
trend. They both start above optimal, and their values fall over time, converging to amounts very close 
to the optimal investment level. Notice that average investment is consistently below average vote. This 
means that the highest voter in each group was often an outlier, and our mechanism for determining 
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investment (using the median vote instead of mean vote) works well by excluding outliers in votes. Two 
lines labeled 98%max(+/-) are added to this graph to indicate the range of values such that, under full 
contributions, subjects would receive more than 98% of the maximum payoff. We can see that starting 
in period 7, average investment is consistently within the 98%-optimal range. By period 10, the average 
investment level is very close to the optimal level. 
 
Figure 2. Trends of Vote and Investment 
Figure 3 shows average M over time. Since M is only a function of investment, the trend of M is very 
similar to that of investment. However, because the relationship between M and investment is non-
linear, there is less volatility in M. In previous studies, the marginal per capita return is usually chosen to 
be 0.3 – 0.4. A high MPCR generally refers to a value of 0.6 or higher (Ledyard, 1995). In our experiment, 
the average resulting M value had an initial value of about 0.68, and reached around 0.58 by period 10. 
Therefore, we can see that subjects have been choosing high MPCRs, which means higher return from 
the public good. Note that the lines indicating 98%-optimal range have been used again in this graph.   
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 Figure 3. Trend of M 
4.2.2 Contribution and Percentage Contribution 
 Figures 4 and 5 show average contribution and average percentage contribution over time. Both 
of them have a downward trend, consistent with the findings from previous studies (Isaac, Walker and 
Thomas, 1984). There is more volatility in the trend of percentage contribution compared to that of 
absolute contribution. This is due to way percentage contribution is calculated; even if absolute 
contribution was constant over time, percentage contribution would be changing if investment level is 
changing.  
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 Figure 4. Trend of Contribution 
 
Figure 5. Trend of Percentage Contribution 
4.3 Convergence Regression Results 
The first sets of regressions are convergence regressions. We adopted the method from 
(Ashenfelter et al, 1992; Plott et al, 2005; Eckel and Grossman, 2005). For each regression, we regress 
the trending variable of interest on two constructed variables—beta_int_var and beta_con_var. The first 
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one, beta_int_var,  represents the average initial value of the trending variable. On the other hand, 
beta_con_var represents the predicted asymptotic value of the variable if the game was to continue for 
an infinite number of rounds. Detailed regression results can be found in Table 2. 
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) 
dependent variable: ave_vote investment ave_cont ave_perc_cont 
beta_int_var 4.683*** 4.666*** 3.080*** 0.576*** 
 (0.186) (0.237) (0.171) (0.026) 
beta_con_var 4.055*** 3.820*** 2.881*** 0.492*** 
 (0.119) (0.142) (0.120) (0.020) 
subjects - - - - 
groups 22 22 22 22 
rounds 1-10 1-10 1-10 1-10 
n 220 220 220 220 
R^2 0.9305 0.895 0.868 0.875 
Table 2. Convergence regression results 
Figures 6 – 9 graph the convergence regression lines for each key variable with a plot of the 
actual data points. All the key variables (vote, investment, contribution, and percentage contribution) 
have downward trends. For both vote and investment, the initial estimate values are above optimal, but 
their convergence estimates are very close to the optimal level; so subjects were able to learn the best 
strategy over time. For absolute contribution and percentage contribution, the downward trends are 
consistent with previous studies (Ledyard, 1995).  
If we look at the numerical regression results, we can see that the estimates for initial value of 
average vote and investment are (difference is less than 0.02). Both of them have a lower convergence 
estimate, but the difference between those two values is greater—about 0.24. This again confirms the 
fact that most people are learning to vote at the correct level, while the high outliers are excluded by 
the voting mechanism. The estimated initial value for percentage contribution is 58%, which is close to 
what has been found in previous studies (Ledyard, 1995). The convergence estimate for percentage 
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contribution is 49%. Although it is lower than the initial value, is it higher than what have been found in 
previous studies—usually, people contribute only around 20% by the end of the game.  
 We also tested each pair of constructed variables to see if they are statistically different from 
one another. The test was significant for average vote and average percentage contribution at the 5% 
level, and significant for investment at the 1% level. However, it was not significant for average absolute 
contribution. As investment falls over time, subjects have higher remainders, so even if percentage 
contribution declines, absolute contributions can stay pretty level. 
 
Figure 6. Convergence Regression for Vote 
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 Figure 7. Convergence Regression for Investment 
 
Figure 8. Convergence Regression for Contribution 
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 Figure 9. Convergence Regression for Percentage Contribution 
The different percentage contributions have different associated maximum payoff functions 
investment. Figure 10 shows the maximum payoff as a function of investment under two different levels 
of percentage contribution: the initial value and the asymptotic value. As we can tell from the graphs, as 
percentage contribution goes down, the top of the payoff function becomes flatter. The investment 
level which will result in maximum payoff also shifts for different contribution levels. 
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 Figure 10. Maximum Payoffs under Different Percentage Contributions 
Table 3 shows the payoff change as a result of the change in investment and percentage 
contribution. As we can see, at the estimated initial investment and contribution level (4.67, 58%), 
payoff is 10.689 lab dollars. At the convergence level of investment and contribution (3.82, 49%), the 
payoff is 10.638 lab dollars. Therefore, although investment becomes closer to optimal, the decline in 
contribution had the dominant effect in terms of change in payoff. As a result, the payoff in final period 
is on average slightly lower than that of the initial period. 
 
Percentage Contribution 
Investment 58% 49% 100% 
4.67 10.689 9.857 14.570 
3.82 11.457 10.638 15.278 
3.33 11.731 10.946 15.396 
Table 3. Payoff for different investment and contribution levels 
4.4 Vote 
Vote was regressed on five variables: lagged vote, lagged investment, lagged contribution, lagged profit, 
and period. We have mainly lagged variables because as explained before, voting is the first stage in 
every period, so no variables from the current period can affect it. 
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 To summarize, we found that vote is positively related to lagged contribution and lagged 
investment; it is negatively related to period. The positive relationship between vote and lagged 
investment is weakly significant in (VII). This means that people tend to vote for values close to the past 
period’s investment—they are trying to reach a consensus on the group investment level. Another 
weakly significant result is the relationship between vote and period. As described before, vote has a 
downward trend, and as a result, subjects are moving towards the optimal investment level over time. 
Vote is positively related to lagged contribution, and this relationship is significant. We believe subjects 
have viewed declining contributions as a signal of being less cooperative, resulting in fewer votes in the 
next round.   
 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) 
vote -1 0.032 - - - - 0.010 - 
 (0.069)     (0.075)  
investment -1 - 0.095 - - - 0.094 0.101* 
  (0.056)    (0.071) (0.053) 
contribution -1 - - 0.130* - - 0.137** 0.137** 
   (0.066)   (0.063) (0.064) 
profit -1 - - - 0.015 - 0.044 0.044 
    (0.045)  (0.041) (0.041) 
period - - - - 0.080*** -0.067* -0.067* 
     (0.026) (0.033) (0.033) 
constant 4.068*** 3.814*** 3.821*** 4.057*** 4.679 3.320*** 3.332*** 
 (0.295) (0.231) (0.197) (0.460) (0.141) (0.627) (0.621) 
subjects 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
groups - - - - - - - 
rounds 2-10 2-10 2-10 2-10 1-10 2-10 2-10 
n 792 792 792 792 880 792 792 
R^2 0.185 0.046 0.021 0.010 0.009 0.054 0.045 
Table 4. Regression results on vote 
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4.5 Investment 
We regressed investment on lagged investment, lagged sum of contributions, lagged average profit, and 
period. Note that investment is a group level variable—there are not many group level variables in our 
study, so there are not many regressions involving investment.  
 Investment is affected by almost all of the variables mentioned above. It is positively related to 
lagged investment, lagged sum of contribution, and average profit, but negatively related to period. In 
our final regression (VI), we did not include lagged average profit, because it is highly correlated with 
lagged investment and lagged sum of contributions. By doing this, our results turned out to be 
significant for almost all variables.  
Investment is positively related to lagged investment (weakly significant), indicating the 
direction of change for investment is consistent over periods. The positive relationship between 
investment and lagged sum of contributions can be explained with a similar story which we have used 
for vote—lower contributions mean less cooperative group members, so subjects invest less, as a result 
of less interest in the public good. The story between investment and lagged average profit is similar to 
that with contribution.  Lastly, the negative relationship between period and investment is significant, 
showing a downward trend. 
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  (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) 
investment -1 0.132* - - - 0.162** 0.120* 
 (0.070)    (0.069) (0.059) 
sumc -1 - 0.069** - - 0.027 0.066** 
  (0.027)   (0.042) (0.024) 
average profit -1 - - 0.151** - 0.132 - 
   (0.067)  (0.114)  
period - - - 0.111*** 0.092** -0.096** 
    (0.033) (0.041) (0.044) 
constant 3.480*** 3.208*** 2.464*** 4.680*** 2.227** 3.320*** 
 (0.290) (0.330) (0.689) (0.179) (0.961) (0.583) 
subjects - - - - - - 
groups 22 22 22 22 22 22 
rounds 2-10 2-10 2-10 1-10 2-10 2-10 
n 198 198 198 220 198 198 
R^2 0.225 0.001 0.002 0.051 0.144 0.112 
Table 5. Regression results on investment 
4.6 Contribution 
We regressed absolute contribution on vote, investment, lagged contribution, lagged average 
contribution of others, lagged profit, and period. As shown in Table 5, there was only one weakly 
significant result—the negative relationship between absolute contribution and period, which is 
consistent with our convergence regression. No other significant result occurred. This is because of the 
complex relationship between absolute contributions and investment—higher investment leads to 
higher contribution, but it also means less money left available to contribute, which makes the result 
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 (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) 
vote -0.013 - - - - - 0.019 - -0.013 
 (0.054)      (0.060)  (0.056) 
investment - -0.108 - - - - -0.127 -0.113 - 
  (0.105)     (0.098) (0.091)  
contribution -
1 
- - 0.059 - - - 0.054 0.056 0.050 
   (0.056)    (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) 
average 
contribution 
others -1 
- - - 0.100 - - 0.032 0.028 0.013 
    (0.082)   (0.196) (0.194) (0.201) 
profit -1 - - - - 0.036 - 0.028 0.028 0.027 
     (0.036)  (0.092) (0.091) (0.094) 
period - - - - - -0.054* -
0.084*** 
-
0.084*** 
-0.073** 
      (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
constant 2.994*** 3.378*** 2.768*** 2.645*** 2.574*** 3.235*** 3.343*** 3.362*** 2.970*** 
 (0.229) (0.427) (0.167) (0.244) (0.374) (0.0158) (0.593) (0.611) (0.491) 
subjects 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
groups - - - - - - - - - 
rounds 1-10 1-10 2-10 2-10 2-10 1-10 2-10 2-10 2-10 
n 880 880 792 792 792 880 792 792 792 
R^2 0.005 0.007 0.221 0.041 0.001 0.007 0.105 0.098 0.082 
Table 6. Regression results on contribution 
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ambiguous. In the next section we will introduce regression results for percentage contribution, which 
has a better control for the offsetting effects of investment. 
4.7 Percentage Contribution 
We regressed percentage contribution with vote, investment, M, lagged percentage contribution, 
lagged average contribution of other people in group, lagged profit, and period. All variables except for 
period have positive coefficients that are significant when included on their own. However, when all the 
variables are put into one large regression, only investment and period have significant coefficients. 
 Percentage contribution is positively related to investment. When investment is higher, M is 
higher, which means there will be higher return from the public good, attracting higher contributions. 
On the other hand, when investment is lower, the public good is not very productive. The per capita 
return rate from is low, and people have less incentive to contribute. The significant negative 
relationship between percentage contribution and period is again consistent with previous findings. The 
downward trend has already been confirmed many times by regressions in our study. 
4.8 Other Findings 
One thing we have noticed is a significant drop in contributions in period 7. Figures 4 and 5 are good 
illustrations of this. Something special must have happened to cause this drop, but we are not sure what 
it is at this moment. However, we did try running our regressions without data from period seven, which 
still produced very similar results.
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(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) (XI) 
vote 0.017** - - - - - - 0.004 - - - 
 
(0.009) 
      
(0.010) 
   M - 0.722*** - - - - - - - - - 
  
(0.178) 
         investment - - 0.059*** - - - - 0.053*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.057*** 
   
(0.013) 
    
(0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
percent 
contribution -
1 - - - 0.099* - - - 0.041 0.041 0.041 - 
    
(0.055) 
   
(0.043) (0.044) (0.045) 
 average 
percent 
contribution 
others -1 - - - - 0.727*** - - 0.006 0.003 - 0.106 
     
(0.182) 
  
(0.216) (0.211) 
 
(0.242) 
profit -1 - - - - - 0.013** - 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.004 
      
(0.005) 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) 
period - - - - - - -0.016*** 0.014*** -0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
       
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
constant 0.443*** 0.064 0.277*** 0.464*** 0.388*** 0.383*** 0.607*** 0.267*** 0.272*** 0.272*** 0.310*** 
 
(0.036) (0.112) (0.054) (0.029) (0.032) (0.056) (0.026) (0.087) (0.089) (0.086) (0.084) 
subjects 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 88 
groups - - - - - - - - - - - 
rounds 1-10 1-10 1-10 2-10 2-10 2-10 1-10 2-10 2-10 2-10 2-10 
n 880 880 880 792 792 792 880 792 792 792 792 
R^2 0.053 0.086 0.083 0.256 0.066 0.002 0.023 0.148 0.142 0.142 0.111 
Table 7. Regression results on percentage contribution 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Summary of Method and Key Results 
In traditional public goods experiments, subjects are divided into groups of four or five. They start each 
period with a fixed amount of money, and decide how much to contribute to the group account. The 
payoff from the group account is the marginal per capita return (MPCR), which is an exogenously 
determined number between zero and one. Each individual personally gets less money back if he/she 
contributes to the group account, but everyone in the group benefits from each contribution. As a result, 
the optimal outcome for the group is for everyone to contribute fully to the group account. After the 
contribution, subjects are informed about their payoffs for the period, and the same process continues 
for a fixed number of periods (e.g. 10).  
 In our study, we changed the game by allowing subjects to determine the MPCR. We added an 
investment stage prior the contribution stage. In the investment stage of each period, subjects voted on 
their desired investment level. After all votes had been cast, the investment level was determined by the 
mean of the two middle votes. The MPCR, which we call M in this experiment, was then calculated as 
√0.1 ∗ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. We decided to calculate M this way because it shows the diminishing marginal 
return to investment. All group members were then informed about the value of M. The contribution 
stage followed the same process as in traditional public goods games. There is one difference though: 
the endowments of subjects are not fixed, since they can only contribute from what was left after the 
investment stage. After all contribution decisions had been made, subjects were informed about their 
payoffs for the period, and the same process continued for ten periods. 
 There are several key findings from our study. First of all, all of our key variables—votes, 
investment, absolute contributions, and percentage contributions—have downward trends. Investment 
is consistently lower than average vote, meaning that there is usually a high voter in each group acting 
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as an outlier. Vote and investment usually start at a high level, but then converge to optimal. We believe 
this trend is a result of the decline in contribution—members view low contributions as signs of non-
cooperativeness, causing them to invest less in subsequent periods. Decline in investment is a good 
thing, while it brings the investment level closer to optimal; the decline in contributions, although 
consistent with previous studies’ findings, is something worth paying attention to, since it decreases 
payoffs significantly.  
 From data analysis, we have found that the effect of declining contributions dominates that of 
investment. The average payoff in final the period is slightly lower than in the initial period. This means 
that we should put more effort on encouraging contributions. On the other hand, if we consider results 
from previous studies, the payoff in the final period is usually a lot lower than that in the initial period. If 
we look at our result from this viewpoint, we can tell that having an endogenously determined MPCR is 
beneficial overall. 
5.2 Recommendations 
From our experimental results, we would like to offer three recommendations for real world policies: 
1. Let people choose the productivity of their public goods. 
As we have stated in the previous section, a voting mechanism was used to endogenously determine 
the MPCR of public good. This worked well, since it alleviated the decline in payoff. In policy designs, we 
suggest more use of endogenously determined MPCR. For example, the government could have more 
consultation with the public through surveys, meetings, councils, committees, and referenda to 
determine investment in the productivity of the public goods. Apparently more money spent on the 
agency will make it more productive—more research can be done, and more policies can be made to 
improve the environmental quality. However, if no one cooperates with the policies (which analog to 
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not contributing to the public good) all the investment will be wasted. Therefore, it is better to invest at 
the level people want. 
2. Use the median voter rule to determine investment level 
Regarding the determination of investment, we have found that there is usually a high outlier in 
each group. Therefore, if the voting mechanism is going to be used in the real world, outliers need to be 
detected and excluded. Using the EPA example again, there might be some people who are very rich, 
and are very concerned about the current environmental issues. Those people would probably want to 
investment millions of dollars, but such amount is unreasonable to most ordinary people. There might 
also be people who do not care about the environment at all—they would probably vote for investing 
zero. Both cases should be taken out of our consideration when determining the actual investment level. 
3. Promote individual contributions 
Contributions have a dominant effect on the resulting payoffs. Therefore, designing policies to 
encourage contributions is very important. Since higher MPCRs result in higher contributions, making 
the public good more productive can be a good way of attracting contributions. Again, consider the 
example of protecting environmental quality. If people are more familiar with the benefit of every small 
action (thus, perceive the MPCR to be higher), such as taking public transportation instead of driving 
private cars, they will have a higher incentive to contribute. 
5.3 Future Work 
In the future, we plan to further study subjects’ behavior with endogenously determined MPCRs. This 
study is only our first step. There is already another study underway, which incorporates income 
inequality. We have outlined three other suggested topics for future research. 
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Our first suggested topic is to have comparison of different group sizes. In real life public game 
scenarios, the group size is usually very large and coordination is much harder. Testing the same 
problem with larger group size makes the experiment a more realistic model. Our second suggestion is 
to include punishment and/or reward in the experimental design. Allowing the institution or group 
members to have the ability to punish low contributors and/or reward high contributors might be able 
to increase the contribution level significantly. Our third suggestions are to include of communication in 
the experiment. Communication has been proved to improve cooperation significantly. We are 
interested we see if it is still a useful tool in this more complicated setting. 
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Appendix A: Experiment Instructions 
 
Instructions 
 
This is an experiment in decision-making. Decisions result in monetary payoffs to be paid in 
cash at the end of the experiment. Payments are considered compensation for the time and effort 
put into making decisions. The experiment lasts a total of about 45 minutes.  
 
Please refrain from speaking with others during the experiment. If you have any questions, raise 
your hand and an experimenter will assist you.  
 
You will be randomly assigned to a group of 4 people. Since the assignment occurs over the 
computer network, you will not know which other people in the room have been assigned to the 
same group as you. 
 
The experiment consists of 10 rounds of decision-making. Each round has 2 stages: the 
investment stage and the contribution stage. I will start by explaining the contribution stage and 
then come back to the investment stage in a few minutes. The contribution stage proceeds as 
follows: 
 
1. Each person begins the contribution stage with a certain amount of money (denoted in 
lab dollars; LD). The exact amount will be explained in a few minutes.  
2. Each person must decide how much of his/her money to contribute to the “group 
account.” Contributions may include up to 2 digits after the decimal point. Any amounts 
not contributed to the group account are simply kept by the person. 
3. The contributions of your 4 group members will be added up and each person will 
receive M times the sum of the 4 contributions. Therefore, the payoffs of each person in 
each round will be: 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 +  𝑀𝑀 ∗  (𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖). So let’s say that 
each person begins the stage with 8 LD, each person keeps 4 LD and contributes 4 LD, 
and M is 0.5. Each person’s payoff will be 4 + 0.5 ∗ (4 + 4 + 4 + 4) = 12 LD. 
4. M is a number between 0 and 1, so for each LD that you contribute to the group account, 
you personally will get less than 1 LD back. However, each other person in your group 
will also receive M LD as a result of your contribution. Similarly, you will benefit from 
the contributions that your group members make. This is the incentive to make 
contributions.  
 
The contribution stage occurs after the investment stage. The purpose of the investment stage is 
to determine the value of M in the contribution stage. The investment stage proceeds as follows: 
 
1. Each person receives 10 LD. 
2. Each person votes on how many LD each person in his/her group will invest in M. Each 
person in your group will invest the same amount. M is determined according to the 
following equation: 𝑀𝑀 = √0.1 ∗ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 where 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the amount invested 
by each person. So if the investment amount is 2.5 LD, M will be �0.1 ∗ (2.5) =
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√0.25 = 0.5. If the investment amount is 4.9 LD, M will be �0.1 ∗ (4.9) = √0.49 = 0.7. 
Two special cases are that 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0 → 𝑀𝑀 = 0 and 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 10 → 𝑀𝑀 = 1. 
3. Here’s how the voting works: Each person enters an investment amount between 0 LD 
and 10 LD (inclusive; up to 1 digit after the decimal point is allowed). The highest and 
lowest votes are dropped and the investment amount is the average of the 2 middle votes. 
Thus, if the votes are 1, 2, 3 and 4, the investment amount will be 2.5 LD. If the votes are 
0, 4, 4 and 7, the investment amount will be 4 LD. 
4. The investment amount is subtracted from each person’s 10 LD, and he/she begins the 
contribution stage with the amount that remains. If the investment amount is 3 LD, each 
person will begin the contribution stage with 7 LD. If the investment amount is 10 LD, 
each person will have 0 LD left, and will have no money left to contribute in the 
contribution stage. 
 
Each of the 10 rounds follows exactly the same process. The groups of 4 are fixed for the whole 
sequence of 10 rounds. At the end of the 10 rounds, payoffs from the 10 rounds will be added up 
and converted to real money at a rate of 1 LD = 0.1 USD. This amount will be added to a $5 
show-up fee to determine your final earnings. 
 
You will be asked some demographic questions and also to provide some contact information. 
Payments will be made in a private manner. 
 
Let me briefly summarize the experiment in the order that each stage will occur: 
 
1. You will be randomly and anonymously assigned to a group of 4 over the computer 
network. 
2. You will complete 10 rounds of decision-making in these groups. 
3. You start each round with 10 LD. 
4. In the investment stage, you vote over how much each member of your group will invest 
in M. 
5. Your group’s investment in M determines M in the contribution stage. 
6. You begin the contribution stage with 10 LD less the investment level that your group 
chose. 
7. You decide how much to contribute to the group account. 
8. The sum of your group members’ contributions to the group account are multiplied by M 
and added to any money that you kept to determine your payoff in the round. 
9. After the 10 rounds, payoffs are added up and converted to real money.  
 
Are there any questions? 
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Appendix B: Experiment Screen Captures 
Figure 11: Voting Screen 
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 Figure 12: Voting Feedback Screen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68 
 
 Figure 13: Contribution Screen 
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 Figure 14: Contribution Feedback Screen 
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